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Abstract
The philosophy of history of 1804 and 1805 enables Fichte to place his 
natural right, developed previously at Jena, against a diachronic background. 
This means that Fichte does not reason merely synchronically from a timeless 
conception of society and state. From a synchronic viewpoint, Fichte cannot 
solve the problem of the control of political power because he has to draw on 
the assumption of a virtuous ephorate. This assumption is not consistent with 
the Fichtean ideal of a philosophy of right completely independent from moral 
considerations. Thus, the control of government is possible only if at least a 
group of citizens can go beyond the mere rational egoism. This new temporal 
conception of the state leads Fichte to think that the problems of consistency 
of his theory of Jena are unavoidable, given that a society integrated by egoist 
individuals cannot be sustained. However, his later philosophy of history 
enables Fichte to state the inexorable annihilation of this type of community and 
gives place to an ensuing epoch, when citizens are not self-interested anymore.
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Resumen
La filosofía de la historia de 1804 y 1805 permite a Fichte ubicar a su 
derecho natural, desarrollado previamente en Jena, en el marco de un trasfondo 
diacrónico. Esto significa que Fichte no razona meramente de modo sincrónico, 
es decir a partir de una concepción atemporal de la sociedad y el Estado. Desde 
un punto de vista sincrónico, Fichte no puede resolver el problema del control 
del poder político, porque debe recurrir al supuesto de un eforato virtuoso. 
Este supuesto no es consistente con el ideal fichteano de una filosofía del 
derecho completamente independiente de consideraciones morales. Por lo 
tanto, el control del gobierno es posible solamente si por lo menos un grupo 
de ciudadanos puede ir más allá del mero egoísmo racional. Esta concepción 
temporal nueva del Estado lleva a Fichte a pensar que los problemas de 
consistencia de esta teoría son inevitables, dado que una sociedad integrada 
por individuos egoístas no es sostenible. Sin embargo, esta filosofía tardía de 
la historia permite a Fichte afirmar la aniquilación inexorable de este tipo de 
comunidad y da lugar a la época siguiente, en la que los ciudadanos ya no son 
auto-interesados.
Palabras-clave: Fichte, Derecho, Egoismo, Ciudadania, Historia.
During his time at Jena, Fichte tries to elaborate a Theory of Right, without 
drawing on moral assumptions, in line with the Kantian idea of a form of 
government which could be applicable even to a people of devils. This implies 
that Fichte builds his theory on the assumption of the universal egoism.2 The 
reason for this project lies in the Fichtean search for the conditions of self-
consciousness, which is understood as the attribution to oneself of the capability 
to act in the sensible world.3
Furthermore, Fichte explains self-consciousness from the recognition of 
the other, because he cannot do so from the relation between subject and object, 
which is characteristic of the relation of knowledge.4 The type of intersubjective 
2  “(…) love ourself above all else and love our fellow citizens for our own sake”, Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, trans. Michael Baur, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 237; “liebe dich selbst über alles, und deine Mitbürger um dein selbst willen”; 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, Jena and Leipzig, 
Christian Ernst Gabler, 1796/179. It is quoted according to Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob, Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt, 
Frommann Verlag, Günther Holzboog, 1966, with the volume and page number. Here: GA, I, 4, § 20, p. 69.
3  “If a rational being is to posit itself, then it must ascribe to itself an activity whose ultimate 
ground lies purely and simply within itself”, Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, 18; “Soll ein 
Vernunftwesen sich als solches setzen, so muss es sich eine Thätigkeit zuschreiben, deren letzter 
Grund schlechthin in ihm selbst liege“; Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts …, GA, I, 3, § 1, p. 329.
4  Jürgen Stolzenberg, “Fichtes Begriff des praktischen Selbstbewusstseins“ (in Wolfram Hogrebe, Fichtes 
Wissenschaftslehre. 1794. Philosophische Resonanzen, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1995), p. 80.
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relationship that makes self-consciousness possible is that in which the other 
summons the I to free action, namely, to self-determination.5 Thus, the other 
conveys to the I the concept that he or she has of him or her, which is the idea 
of a rational being. But this communication is possible only if the other acts in 
a certain way, that is, according to some formal conditions. The most important 
of these rules consists of the delimitation of a space of action identical for the 
I and the other. The principle of right, as Fichte names this fundamental rule, 
implies that the I is free to respond or not to the summons of the other because 
otherwise the I would not retain his or her sphere of free actions, and that 
principle would not be valid.6
Given that the I remains free to respect the sphere of actions of the other or 
not to do so, it remains definitely open to the possibility that the I impinges upon 
the capability of agency of the other and eventually the conditions of his or her 
self-consciousness. As a result, Fichte deems it necessary to introduce a third 
instance that must settle the conflicts that may arise between the I and the other, 
which is the state. In order for this political community to fulfil its function, 
it must be designed as a set of rules that are meant to control egoists and not 
virtuous citizens so that they do not put in danger the freedom of the others. This 
is the aim of the social contract, in all its levels and dimensions. For this reason, 
the property contract, which is the first moment of the civil contract, aims only 
at each citizen engaging in refraining to interfere in the sphere of actions of the 
others.7 In a second moment, Fichte suggests the necessity of complementing 
this first contract with the contract of protection, which requires the positive 
engagement in defending the citizen whose property is in danger.8
In order to give effect to the contract of protection, the citizens must enter 
in the contract of unification (Vereinigungsvertrag) to constitute themselves in 
a community.9 This requires, in turn, the signature of the contract of submission 
(Unterwerfungsvertrag), through which everyone engages in obeying the 
government as subjects.10 As a consequence, everyone accepts in advance 
paying the penalties that they would receive in the case of infringing upon the 
former contracts in terms of the contract of expiation (Abbüssungsvertrag).11 
In the following section, I will try to show that Fichte does not succeed in 
sustaining the project of a theory of right without taking into consideration the 
moral philosophy, but he must draw on moral assumptions in order to sustain 
the civil contract.
5  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 3, p. 342.
6  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 4, p. 358.
7  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 4, § 17, p. 8.
8  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 4, § 17, pp. 9-11.
9  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 4, § 17, p. 15.
10  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 4, § 17, p.17.
11  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 4, § 20, p. 60.
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1. The Control of the Government in the Natural Right of Jena
The moral and psychological assumption of universal egoism leads Fichte 
to necessarily restrain popular participation in the government, thus taking a 
definitely anti-Rousseauian turn.12 The government must concentrate all the 
power in its hands and make impossible all forms of civil participation in 
the making of decisions that are relevant to common life because otherwise 
the people would fall into an inevitable social fragmentation and a war of all 
against all. This requirement is materialized by the submission contract, by 
virtue of which each citizen confines him or herself to the domestic and private 
dimension, limiting him or herself to fulfil the role allotted in the social division 
of labor as centrally planned by the state.
Nevertheless, the problem presented by this model of the exercise of power 
is the control of who makes the decisions. Fichte establishes the ephorate as a 
mediation to solve the task of monitoring who must control the citizens.13 The 
ephors do not have coercive power over the government, even though they can 
proclaim an interdict and call it to a popular assembly in order to submit the 
government to a political judgment.14 However, the ephorate must be composed 
of citizens chosen by their peers because of their virtues and wisdom (i.e., 
for not being egoists). The reason for that is that should the ephors be self-
interested, they would reproduce the problem of the control of the ephors, who, 
in turn, must control the government and must do so with the citizens.15 Here, 
Fichte finds one of the limits or blind spots of his theory because he must draw 
on ethical assumptions in order to build a theory that is meant to be independent 
of moral considerations.
These limitations acquire dramatic touches when Fichte must face the 
possibility that the ephors do not result in being as virtuous as expected and 
become corrupt themselves or are threatened by the government, because the 
armed forces must be only in the hands of the person who steers the state, 
according to the assumption of universal egoism. Fichte tries to solve this 
12  It is for this reason that Fichte achieves a republican synthesis of three moments. The first is 
a Rousseauian moment: the idea that the people are the supreme power and the origin of all power, 
whereby the general will is affirmed. In the second place, there is a Lockean moment, which appears 
in the criticism of the direct democracy as a form of despotism and the defense of the representative 
democracy. And finally, a Hobbesian moment can be found in the Fichtean Natural Right, that is, the 
unit of legislative, juridical, and executive powers, Alain Renaut, Le Système de Droit. Philosophie et 
droit dans la pensée de Fichte, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1986, pp. 378-379).
13  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 16, p. 441.
14  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 16, p. 449.
15  “(…) the kind of person who should become an ephor is one who has gained the attention and 
trust of the people (who, precisely in order to fulfill this sublime task of electing the ephors, will 
continuously notice their great and honest men)” (Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, p. 159; “auf 
wen das Auge und das Zutrauen des Volks fällt, welches, gerade um dieser erhabenen Wahl willen, 
auf seine biederen und grossen Männer fortgehend aufmerken wird, derselbe wird Ephor“; Fichte, 
Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 16, p. 456).
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eventuality by resorting to the possibility that some citizens rebel against the 
authorities and the ephorate itself. These rebels are the “natural ephors”, that 
is, citizens with a sense of justice that drives them to jeopardize their lives 
in order to preserve the common freedom and property.16 Furthermore, Fichte 
foresees an eventual result of this conflict, in which the same natural ephors 
are condemned as if they had become corrupted and merely seditious. This 
sentence will be absolutely supported by law, given that the natural ephors are, 
by definition, outside of the system.17
As in the case of the protection contract, Fichte is forced to draw again on 
normative and moral assumptions in order to maintain and give stability to the 
legal system. This juridical construction is meant to be morally neutral, even 
though it ultimately does not have enough internal mechanisms to preserve 
it in case the ephors become corrupted. In other words, the Fichtean theory 
needs mechanisms of popular participation that go beyond the mere meeting 
on occasion of an eventual political judgment to the government. Thus, I 
consider that, in such a case, the theory would acquire certain sustainability, 
given that the people are able to control the ephors and to intervene in case they 
become severely corrupted. On the other hand, as Hegel wisely remarks, only 
the regular participation of citizens in political life would make possible the 
development of the virtues and emotions which are necessary to participate in 
the popular assemblies in an eventual political judgment.18 
Resuming the considerations of the former section, the Fichtean idea of 
education actually remains restricted to the familiar and domestic domain. For 
this reason, this idea of education reinforces the problem that the citizens live 
isolated among the political community, without cultivating the social bonds 
that make possible a shared political action.
I think that it would have been convenient if Fichte would nuance from the 
beginning the strength of his assumption of universal egoism in order to give 
place to the normative moral assumptions that are necessary to give stability 
to the contract of submission. Finally, this decision would have given more 
explicative power and an important proportion of consistency to his theory of 
natural right. Only in this way would the theory be able to give an account of 
the problem of the recognition of the other and therefore of self-consciousness. 
Later, in his text, The System of the Science of Right, written in 1812, Fichte 
will face this problem again, even though he will solve it in a very different 
way.
16  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 16, p. 457.
17  Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA, I, 3, § 16, p. 458.
18  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, 
seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften; 
in: Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, Bd. II, Part 2, [November/December] 1802, Part 3, [May/
June] 1803. Quoted according to the edition: G.W.F. Hegel: Werke in 20 Bänden; Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, Volume 2, 474.
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2. The State as a Condition of Morality
Fichte seems to be aware of the aforementioned problems, given that in 
The System of the Science of Right, he reformulates from the beginning his 
previous conception of the relationship between right and ethics. In contrast to 
the natural right of Jena, Fichte in his later philosophy maintains that right has 
a mere propaedeutic function because it has the aim to protect each citizen’s 
freedom so that it makes it possible the development of each subject and 
therefore paves the way to the reign of moral law.19
As Geismann rightly points out, this displacement from an amoral 
conception of right to a conception that puts it in the service of morality is 
consistent. From the background of the natural right of Jena, Fichte states that 
the principle of right has a hypothetical validity. This means that individuals 
must submit to the principle of right only if they want to enter into a legal 
community. As a consequence, this imperative does not have a binding 
character but is conceived as completely amoral.20 Therefore, the state remains 
at the service of the hazardous aim of establishing a legal community. That is 
the reason why the state is compatible with an indeterminate series of aims, 
among which is the service of morality.
In order to protect the conditions of morality, the right must guarantee 
the self-preservation of each individual in existence and his or her exercise of 
property rights.21 Taking into account the moral development of individuals, 
the right must guarantee them a reasonable quantity of time for leisure for 
them to be able to realize the supersensible aims of morality without the state 
interfering in their privacy.22 In Fichte’s words: the state is the moral factual 
condition of morality (die sittliche faktische Bedingung der Sittlichkeit).23 
However, the state cannot enforce moral freedom without falling into a despotic 
form of government. Instead, it must merely protect the space of freedom that 
the citizens need to pursue their moral aims.24 Meanwhile, it is not about the 
state being forced to fulfil this rather negative obligation, but it has to fulfil an 
additional positive obligation of designing an educational system that enables 
individuals to develop their moral capabilities.25
19  Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, in Fichtes Sämtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel 
Hermann Fichte, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1971, Volume X, 500-502.
20  „Georg Geismann, „Fichtes ‚Aufhebung‘ des Rechtsstaates“, Fichte- Studien. Band 3. 
Sozialphilosophie, Amsterdam, Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1991, pp. 86-117“.
21  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 517.
22  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 544.
23  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 540.
24  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 539.
25  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, pp. 540-542.
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Geismann states that this moralizing conception of the state is 
authoritarian.26 This reactionary character is based upon the idea that the state 
does not only guarantee external freedom (as was the case in the natural right 
of Jena) but also the reign of inner or material liberty, i.e., the autonomy of 
citizens. Therefore, the state is legitimated to force those citizens who are 
not determining their will by the moral law.27 In other words, according to 
Geismann’s interpretation, the state has the function to coerce the citizens to 
pursue a particular purpose, which is the realization of moral law. Furthermore, 
Geismann argues that this conception of the state is contradictory. The reason 
for that is that if the citizens are morally autonomous, they cannot accept that 
an external force coerces them to determine their will by the moral law. As a 
consequence, this moralizing conception of the state would destroy the same 
moral freedom it is meant to establish.28
It is the same case, argues Geismann, if we take into account the material 
aspect of freedom. On the one hand, the law cannot foresee the variety of 
actions that the subjects will realize in order to materialize the moral law, 
because the law contains only general indications. On the other hand, hazard 
or contingency plays a decisive role when putting into practice the moral aims. 
This role implies, in turn, that the courses of action performed necessarily will 
be affected by a series of unpredictable circumstances. Finally, the concrete 
courses of action that the citizens perform to materialize the moral aims could 
be involved in conflicts with each other, which implies that the law could not 
be applied in order to resolve them.29 Geismann states that the Fichtean theory 
leads to a “suppression of the state of right”, because while centralizing all 
the power in the government, the latter remains excluded from the same law it 
passes. Therefore, the government that coerces the citizens to pursue the moral 
law must be morally perfect.30
Against Geismann’s interpretation, Schottky argues that the Fichtean 
theory does not constitute a form of a moralizing despotism.31 In the first 
26  „Geismann, „Fichtes ‚Aufhebung‘ des Rechtsstaates“. This thesis is also developed in Manuel 
Jiménez-Redondo, “Fichte gegen Napoleon: Die zugrundeliegenden Ideen von Freiheit und Nation”, 
Fichte-Studien. Band 44. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Systematik der Transzendentalphilosophie, ed. 
Marco Ivaldo, Leiden, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing, 2017, pp. 190-208, 193-207 and Alois K. 
Soller, „Nationale Erziehung und sittliche Bestimmung“, Fichte-Studien, Band 2. Kosmopolitismus 
und Nationalidee, New York, Rodopi, 1990, p. 107.
27  Geismann, „Fichtes ‚Aufhebung‘ des Rechtsstaates“, pp. 106-107.
28  Geismann, „Fichtes ‚Aufhebung‘ des Rechtsstaates“, p. 110.
29  Geismann, „Fichtes ‚Aufhebung‘ des Rechtsstaates“, p. 111.
30  Geismann, „Fichtes ‚Aufhebung‘ des Rechtsstaates“, pp. 114, 117.
31  Siep argues too that the later Fichte remains faithful to the principles of the French Revolution, 
even though he leaves out the aspects referred to in the protection of the rights of the individual 
and emphasizes those which are related to the collective dimension of the nation; Ludwig Siep, 
“Revolution, Nation und Individuum in Fichtes philosophischer Entwicklung” in Fichte-Studien. 
Band 44. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Systematik der Transzendentalphilosophie, ed. Marco Ivaldo, 
Leiden: Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing, 2017, pp. 144, 150. On the other hand, Bloch remarks 
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place, Schottky states that Fichte associates the coercion of the state only with 
the external use of freedom but never with the inner domain of the material 
or moral freedom.32 This association means that the state has the function to 
guarantee the factual conditions of morality, the first of which is the formal and 
external disposition of the citizens to fulfil the law, without caring about what 
its moral motives could be.33 In respect to the development of morality, the 
Fichtean state has, at most, the function of establishing educative institutions.34 
Therefore, from Schottky’s viewpoint, the responsibility for one’s own moral 
improvement remains in the hands of the citizen’s free will. In the same context, 
Schottky retorts to Geismann that there is another reason for concluding that 
the Fichtean theory of the state does not imply a form of despotism. This reason 
is based upon the theory of popular control over the political power through 
the education of a critical citizenship.35 I agree with Schottky’s argumentation, 
given that Fichte remains worried in his late philosophy about the problem of 
the popular control, which had remained unsolved in the natural right of the 
Jena period. I think it is important to consider the Fichtean argumentation with 
some detail.
In this context, Fichte resumes the theoretical problem that he has faced 
in his theory of the ephorate in the context of his Foundations of the Natural 
Right. The argument developed by Fichte can be reconstructed as follows. The 
people can coerce the ephorate in order to initiate a revolution with any motive, 
even in the case that this is illegitimated or unnecessary, because the power of 
coercion is possessed only by the government. Nevertheless, the government 
surely will use its power of coercion in order to submit the ephorate, as had 
actually happened with the Roman patricians.36 On the other hand, the ephorate 
in itself is not desirable because the ephors are chosen by the people and are at 
the service of the resolution of the assembly in the case of a political judgment. 
However, even though it is true that, from the formal viewpoint, the people’s 
judgment is always in accordance with right, even when there is a judge that is 
above the people, not always is it so from the material viewpoint. This means 
that Berliner Fichte defends a sort of “mystical democracy”. Besides, Bloch argues that Fichte 
criticizes strongly every form of tyranny, inasmuch as he denounces Napoleon Bonaparte´s policy 
of military conquest. According to Bloch, his criticism is applicable even to Hitler himself, opposing 
the Nazi appropriation of Fichte; Ernst Bloch, „Fichtes Reden an die deutsche Nation (1943)“, (in 
Werkausgabe. Band 11. Politische Messungen, Pestzeit, Vormärz, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1985), pp. 304, 309.
32  Richard Schottky, „Rechtsstaat und Kulturstaat bei Fichte. Eine Erwiderung“, Fichte- Studien. 
Band 3. Sozialphilosophie, Amsterdam, Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1991, p. 142.
33  Schottky, „Rechtsstaat und Kulturstaat“, pp. 143-144, 146.
34  Schottky, „Rechtsstaat und Kulturstaat“, p. 145.
35  Schottky, „Rechtsstaat und Kulturstaat“, p. 138.
36  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 632; Allen Wood, “Fichte´s Philosophy of Right and 
Ethics” (in The Cambridge Companion to Fichte, eds. Gunther Zöller and David James, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 186.
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that in The System of the Science of Right, Fichte acknowledges that the people 
can give a wrong judgment, given that the political judgment is settled only 
by the vote of the majority. Thence, Fichte concludes that it is better to trust a 
selected group among the wisest rather than in a majority that God knows how 
it has been possible to gather.37
Fichte states that the ephorate is an institution that could exist among a 
morally bad or ignorant people.38 Nevertheless, the functions of the ephorate 
can be fulfilled rightly by a well-informed public. The government will take 
care not to contradict an educated people who will ask the government to give 
an account of its actions and will threaten the authority to call the whole people 
in the event that it does not listen to them.39 
Therefore, Fichte states that the solution for the problem of the control 
of the government is the moral education of its citizenship. Thus, a critical 
citizenship with a vigilant attitude is the best corrective for a corrupt and unfair 
government. In this point, Fichte is in line at least partially with the republican 
tradition.40 In this text, Fichte disbelieves the existence of formal mechanisms 
that could make it possible that the best rule the community. On the one hand, if 
the government is a bad person, then he or she would not be willing to transfer 
the power to another person. On the other hand, if the government is a good 
person, then he or she will not deem that there is another person more apt to 
rule than him or herself and will resist passing power to another person. Finally, 
neither will the people be able to choose the best for the government because 
each citizen will believe in good faith that he or she is the best suited for the 
role.41
Consequently, Fichte leaves the decision about who is the best of all and 
therefore is the one who will have to rule the community in the hands of the 
divine government of the world. The wisest must limit themselves to lead the 
people so that the necessary moral progress can be achieved in order to rule 
the state according to right. Meanwhile, it seems arbitrary and less compelling 
to put in the hands of the “divine government of the world” the solution of the 
right election of the government. I consider that the meaning of this expression 
has to do with what Fichte calls the “plan of the universe”, that is, a progressive 
conception of history that culminates in the absolute state. 
From James´s viewpoint, Fichte conceives an idea of a plan of the universe 
in terms of a postulate of the practical reason. This implies that the necessity 
37  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 633.
38  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, pp. 633-634.
39  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, p. 633.
40  Philip Pettit has defended a similar thesis inasmuch as he has argued that the civility enables 
the citizens to develop mechanisms to control the government and the groups of power in order to 
preserve their rights; Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 247-269.
41  Fichte, Das System der Rechtslehre, pp. 634-635.
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to believe in a historical progress is a rational faith in the possibility of the 
historical realization of the supreme good.42 That is to say, the agent must 
suppose that history tends to a constant expansion of relationships based upon 
freedom. Against James, I consider that Fichte actually states that history has 
a real progressive dynamic. It is for this reason that Fichte argues that we are 
wrapped up in this process and because of that we have our freedom of action 
restricted in some sense.
This can be seen clearly in Fichte´s diagnosis of his epoch. Fichte 
definitively believes that he lives in the third epoch. Therefore he considers 
that right can only hope for an efficient regulation of the interactions between 
rational egoists. This means that Fichte does not deem possible an effective 
control of the government, given that the epochal horizon hinders the moral 
formation of virtuous citizens. This conviction leads Fichte to consider 
Napoleonic imperialism as the highest point of his epoch, marked by selfishness 
and materialism, as well as by the unbridled grasping for power.
From my viewpoint, Fichte tries to reconstruct in his texts of philosophy 
of history the way in which humanity actually arrived at the current cultural and 
moral situation. He wants to make intelligible the causes that give a genealogical 
sense to the challenges he had to face. Nevertheless, Fichte articulates 
a reasoned conception of the whole historical path, which opens in turn an 
optimistic perspective of the future. In relationship to the future, Fichte does 
not endorse a deterministic conception but concludes that certain possibilities 
of action are left open. However, the effective realization of a future of freedom 
and peace for humanity depends on the decisions that persons make in each 
case. As we shall see bellow, the education in the Doctrine of Knowledge, as 
well as the development of the art of governing will make possible a positive 
outcome for our human race. That means that Fichte trusts in the possibility of 
the development of rationality in history. My hypothesis is that Fichte trusts 
in the idea that the historical progress will put the necessary conditions in 
order for the people to choose their government wisely. In order to unravel this 
argumentative moment, I think that it is necessary in the first place to take into 
account the philosophy of history, which is at the base of the Fichtean theory.
3. The Idea of an Absolute State and the Culmination of History
Fichte develops his conception of history in The Characteristics of 
the Present Age, a series of conferences given between 1804 and 1805 but 
published in 1806. The text begins with the establishment of the ultimate aim 
42  David James, Fichte´s Republic. Idealism, History and Nationalism, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp. 90, 92, 94-95, 105.
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of the human species, which is the axis that makes sense of history. This aim 
is that humanity structures their relationships using reason and acting freely.43
As a consequence, Fichte arrives at the concept of a plan of the universe, 
which structures all epochs through a rational deduction of each of them from 
the final state toward which humanity must strive.44 In summary, the plan of the 
universe for humanity consists of five epochs. Given that the ultimate aim of 
humanity is to self-govern rationally, there necessarily must have been a first 
epoch in which rationality was present, though inchoately. The reason for that 
is that nothing can result from nothing, and, therefore, rationality cannot be 
the result of a complete irrationality. In this first epoch, reason rules through 
rational instinct (“the state of the innocence of the human race”, der Stand der 
Unschuld des Menschengeschlechts).
It is followed by a second epoch, in which the rational instinct is imposed 
by a group of rulers on the subjects and is called “the epoch of the inchoate 
sinfulness” (der Stand der anhebenden Sünde). The reason for this transition 
to the second epoch is that human beings need a certain social organization in 
order to meet their needs. However, given that human beings are still under the 
influence of the moral instinct, they cannot know the grounds of their rational 
beliefs, so they must be imposed by force. Therefore, human beings must 
submit coactively so that they obey the government.
Nevertheless, along the path of growing in rationality and freedom, 
human beings will inevitably rebel against those authorities who impose 
rational truths by force and without the subjects knowing their grounds. Fichte 
deems that the current epoch is the third historical epoch. The reason for that 
is that the liberation of the rational instinct takes place in the third epoch, 
which is present coactively in the ruling classes of the second epoch. Fichte 
calls the third epoch “the epoch of the complete sinfulness” (der Stand der 
vollendeten Sündhaftigkeit). The meaning of this name is that the individual, 
while rebelling against the rational instinct, does so against reason in general 
and truth itself.45 On the other hand, given that this rebellion is directed against 
the blind obedience of the mandates, the individual remains satisfied with that 
43  „Der Zweck des Erdenlebens der Menschheit sey der, dass sie in demselben alle ihre Verhältnisse 
mit Freiheit nach der Vernunft einrichte (...)“; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen 
Zeitalters, Das System der Rechtslehre, in Fichtes Sämtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 
Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1971, Volume VII, p. 7.
44  Herder had criticized the historical teleological determinism, pointing out to the role which there 
is played by the hazard; Johann Gottfried Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung 
der Menschheit, Stuttgart, Reclam, 2007, pp. 36-38, 56-57, 83-84. Berlin states that in the last instance 
Herder falls in a historical relativism; Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder. Two Studies in the History of 
Ideas London, Chatto & Windus, 1980, pp. 210-211. On the contrary, Wood argues that Herder aims at 
making true judgments in respect to the way in which each culture developed itself; Allen Wood, The 
Free Development of Each: Studies on Freedom, Right and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 128.
45  Fichte, Grundzüge, p. 18.
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which can be conceived clearly. In this sense, the third epoch is a mediation to 
the fourth one.46 Nevertheless, the individual in the current epoch conceives 
the world from his or her need to subsist, for which he or she has after all the 
purpose of maximizing the technical quality of adequate tools.47 Therefore, the 
actions of altruists are disqualified as naïve and irrational.48
In the fourth epoch, humanity develops and internalizes rational science 
(die Epoche der Vernunftwissenschaft). Finally, on the horizon of history there 
is the image of a humanity that organizes their relationships rationally and 
freely. This is the fifth epoch, or the “epoch of the complete justification and 
sanctification” (der Stand der vollendeten Rechtfertigung und Heiligung).49 
This means humanity in this final epoch must be provided with the art of acting 
rationally. According to Fichte, the individual acts rationally when he or she 
sacrifices his or her individuality in pursuit of the unity of the human species.50 
The reason for that is that individuals are mere appearances of the only and 
universal reason, which must manifest itself necessarily in the form of the 
human species, that is, as divided into several individualities.51 The rational life 
manifests itself as a love for itself inasmuch as the individual feels approbation, 
respect, and veneration for this ideal. In this sense, the individual develops the 
love for the rational life, which is self-reliant and is the most perfect form of 
happiness.52
Besides, the idea of state that Fichte deems must have been established in 
the last epoch of history is considerably different from the one he developed in 
the Foundations of Natural Right. Fichte states that the culmination of human 
progress must take place in the “absolute state”.53 The absolute state is a product 
of a rational art, which presupposes that the individuals have grasped and 
internalized the central elements of the science of knowledge (which can take 
place only in the fourth epoch). Thence, the state, from the formal viewpoint, 
has the function of coercing the individuals to direct their forces to the ultimate 
aim of the human species. Nevertheless, the content of this ultimate aim has 
to be established. In other words, the matter of the absolute state must be 
determined. The ultimate aim of the human species is the subsistence of human 
beings in order to promote the development of culture. For this reason, the 
matter of the absolute state is the guarantee of this fundamental good.54
46  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 20-21.
47  Fichte, Grundzüge, p. 26; Alexander Aichele, “Ending Individuality: The Mission of a Nation in 
Fichte´s Addresses to the German Nation”, in The Cambridge Companion to Fichte, eds. David James 
and Günther Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 258-259.
48  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 29-31.
49  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 11-12.
50  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 34-35, 37.
51  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 22-26.
52  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 39-41, 56-58.
53  Fichte, Grundzüge, p. 144.
54  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 145-147.
91Morality and State in the Fichtean Political Philosophy
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 21, nº 41. 
Primer semestre de 2019. Pp. 79-96.  ISSN 1575-6823  e-ISSN 2340-2199  doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2019.i41.04
Even though some individuals play the role of government, that is, of 
directing the forces of the others, Fichte actually defends a relatively strict 
egalitarianism.55 Although the citizens put their forces at the service of the state, 
they are all sovereign, because they have to make the state remember the aim 
it has to pursue.56 On the other hand, this egalitarianism is expressed in the 
requirement that all citizens receive the product of their effort in the form of 
basic social rights.57 Furthermore, the popular classes must be freed from the 
obligation to satisfy the whims of the dominant classes, because they must use 
their forces to contribute to the common good.58
4. Final Remarks
The philosophy of history of 1804 and 1805 enables Fichte to place his 
natural right developed previously in Jena against a diachronic background. 
As such, Fichte does not reason merely synchronically from a timeless 
conception of society and state. From a synchronic viewpoint, Fichte cannot 
solve the problem of the control of political power, because he has to draw 
on the assumption of a virtuous ephorate. As it was argued, this assumption 
is not consistent with the Fichtean ideal of a philosophy of right completely 
independent from moral considerations. Thus, the control of government is 
possible only if at least a group of citizens can go beyond mere rational egoism. 
Meanwhile, it can be argued that Fichte in his Berliner period takes account 
of the historicity of social processes and political structures. Following this line 
of reasoning, it is possible to state that Fichte adopts a diachronic viewpoint 
where he can place the systematic problems of his previous theory against the 
background of a historical process. This new temporal conception of the state 
leads Fichte to think that the problems of consistency of his theory of Jena are 
unavoidable, given that a society integrated by egoist individuals cannot be 
sustained. However, his later philosophy of history enables Fichte to state the 
inexorable annihilation of this type of community that gives place to an ensuing 
epoch when the citizens are not self-interested anymore.
This is the last epoch of humanity in which the development of the absolute 
state takes place. As has been argued, the citizens must have had access to a 
moral and philosophical formation that must have enabled them to exercise 
reason in order to know the supersensible world. Against the background of this 
new political and legal frame, Fichte aims at solving the problem of control of 
political power and of the stability of the submission contract. Besides, Fichte 
55  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 160-161.
56  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 152-153.
57  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 157-159.
58  Fichte, Grundzüge, pp. 207-209.
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can also give an account of the role that the moral civic education plays in order 
to fulfil the protection contract. This means that Fichte understands that he can 
give stability to his theory of right only from an ideal of citizenship in which 
virtue has a central place. Thus, Fichte moves the solution to the systematic 
problems posed by his philosophy of right from Jena to a later epoch, where the 
culmination of history will take place.
My hypothesis is that this temporal conception of the state comes from the 
evaluation by Fichte of the political, cultural, and moral crisis of the German 
nation he witnesses. After carrying out this analysis, Fichte deems in The 
Characteristics of the Present Age that he is living in the third epoch. Three 
years later, Fichte notes that the situation has worsened and Germany has 
arrived at a cutoff point of decadence. From the Fichtean viewpoint, this has 
led the nation to the threshold of the fourth epoch.59 The German government 
has fallen into ease and laziness and has not taken care to enforce the law and 
to exercise its authority over its subjects.60 As a consequence, the Germans have 
fallen into the hands of the Napoleonic forces. Fichte thinks that the French 
are a barbaric and individualist people from their very origin, whose highest 
exemplar is Louis XIV. They rebelled in order to break the chains that enslaved 
them but were deceived by Napoleon, who promised them their freedom.61 
France, the enemy of Germany in this war, is driven only by the frantic search 
for power and richness and is willing to subdue the other countries with terror.62 
Therefore, the Napoleonic Empire means for Fichte the exacerbation and 
culmination of the third epoch and its extreme egoism.
While in the natural right, Fichte built a theory of right based upon the 
right to coercion; now he deems it unsustainable. The reason for that is that 
the egoism of the government and its indolence when having to apply the law 
produced an atmosphere of lawlessness. This situation broke the bond that 
unified the people with their government, which was based upon fear and hope, 
namely, rational egoism.63 This means that Fichte in his natural right of Jena 
stated that the citizens could at least behave as rational egoists, i.e., they will 
maximize their preferences, even though between the limits set by the law. In 
other words, the egoism of the citizens could be restricted at least by the fear of 
59  Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, Die Staatslehre oder über das Verhältnis 
des Urstaates zum Vernunftreiche, in Fichtes Sämtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin, 
Walter de Gruyter, 1971, Volume VII, pp. 264-265. For this reason, Reiß defines the third epoch as a 
“null point” (Stunde Null), placed between the disappearance of the ancient world and the rise of the 
new one in the form of the fourth epoch; Stefan Reiß, Fichtes ‘Reden an die deutsche Nation‘, Berlin, 
Akademie Verlag, 2006, 26.
60  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 270-271.
61  Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Die Staatslehre oder über das Verhältnis des Urstaates zum 
Vernunftreiche, in Fichtes Sämtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 
1971, Volume IV, p. 424.
62  Fichte, Die Staatslehre, p. 427.
63  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 272-273, 283-284.
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losing their freedom and property as a consequence of violating the law. Fichte 
assumed then that an egoist citizen could be prudent enough to recognize the 
restrictions set by the penal law and act according to them. In other words, 
Fichte assumed a moral psychology according to which the prevision of the 
negative consequences for one’s own preferences could restrict the actual 
behavior. For this reason, egoism had its own limit, and there was no danger of 
it becoming unbridled.
On the contrary, in his later texts, Fichte notes that education has 
produced in the German people a reckless and destructive egoism. The aim 
of education has been, above all, the instrumental utility of what is learned. 
Thus, the citizens have been aiming only at maximizing their advantages. This 
conception of subjectivity has produced such corruption that it is not possible to 
make a constructive use of the citizens’ self-interest anymore.64 Therefore, the 
moral-psychological foundations of the Fichtean theory of natural right have 
disappeared, and the philosophical developments of 1796 and 1797 must be 
revised. It is for this reason that Fichte undertakes such a decisive reformulation 
of not a few of the aspects of his political theory. 
Therefore, Fichte states in his Addresses to the German Nation that the 
people must be educated in order to develop an attitude of abhorrence toward 
the dishonorable, petty, and egoist behavior. Thus, the people will try to do 
their best to correct this type of situation.65 For that purpose, it is necessary to 
eliminate the distinction between the estate of the scholars and the people trained 
for manual labor. In other words, the literary and philosophical formation is not 
to be the privilege of a few but must be an obligation for all the people. This 
explains the requirement of a public formation of a humanistic type, which 
must develop in the citizens the faculty to know the supersensible world and 
to love philosophical research. Only in that way could the entire people be 
educated in the love for justice, the feeling of duty, and the love for fatherland.66
As a result of this process, the people must be capable of forming by 
themselves the image of a new nation to be built.67 Along this line, the Germans 
are a privileged people because their language enables them to know the 
supersensible in analogy with the everyday sensible world.68 This means that 
64  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 289-290, 428-431.
65  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 273-274.
66  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 276-277, 280-281 384-385, 419-421. This is a central 
debate for the tradition of the Bildung; Frederick Beiser, “A Romantic Education. The Concept of 
Bildung in early German romanticism”, in Philosophers on Education, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 
London / New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 289.
67  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 284-285. This thesis is in line with the tradition 
of the Bildung, which comes from the concept of self-formation coined by Shaftesbury; Reinhardt 
Koselleck, Begriffgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen 
Sprachen, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2006, p. 109.
68  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 315-318, 327, 331-332. In this point, Reiß notes the 
influence of August Wilhelm Schlegel (Reiß, Fichtes ‚Reden an die deutsche Nation‘, pp. 120-124).
94 Hector Oscar Arrese Igor
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 21, nº 41. 
Primer semestre de 2019. Pp. 79-96.  ISSN 1575-6823  e-ISSN 2340-2199  doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2019.i41.04
German is the only language that can enable us to know the metaphysical world 
and moral ideals. Therefore, only the Germans can conceive the ideal of a just 
nation.69
For the former reasons, Fichte opposes the mechanical idea of the state, 
which is meant to work as a machine by the coercion of the citizens, who 
will obey the law for fear of losing their freedom and property.70 Against the 
background of this mechanical idea of the state, coercion cannot come from 
the people because they could not force themselves to perform an action or to 
punish themselves. The reason for that is that if the people agree with what is 
prescribed by the norm, they would not need to compel themselves to obey it. 
However, the people neither agree with the norm nor could force themselves to 
fulfil it, given that they have the power to resist such a coercion by themselves, 
the people being the subject who is applying it to themselves. 
Against the background of this mechanical conception of the state, 
coercion must be exerted by the government in order for the system to be self-
sustainable. This means that the government is able to compel the people but 
cannot force itself for the same reason the people cannot do so. Therefore, 
this conception of the state is based upon the hazard that the government is 
virtuous.71 Hence, it is an unstable conception of the political government. As 
was concluded before, Fichte rejects even the idea of the ephorate, which plays 
a central role in his theory of 1796 and 1797, because it is grounded in this 
assumption. Against this mechanical and hazardous ideal of the state, Fichte 
comes up with the education of the people in virtue in order to give stability to 
his theory.72 In other words, an educated people are the only effective control of 
a centralized government, because they do not exert a direct coercion against 
the authorities but submit them to constant surveillance. In summary, Fichte 
concludes the necessity to overcome the mere legal state (Rechtsstaat) in order 
to establish the cultural state (Kulturstaat).
69  However, as Bloch points out, Fichte does not stand for a closed and aggressive nationalism, 
given that the nation is not something given but an ideal meant to be freely built. On the other hand, 
the nation is not closed in itself unit but a mediation between the individual and the human species. 
This means that authentic patriotism leads to orient one’s own nation in a cosmopolitan way; Ernst 
Bloch, „Fichtes Reden an die deutsche Nation (1943)”, pp. 300-303.
70  James states that this conception can be tracked back to the moral psychology developed by 
Helvétius in De l´esprit; James, Fichte´s Republic, pp. 100-102.
71  Fichte, Reden an die deutsche Nation, pp. 364-366.
72  The idea of the state as a Bildungsanstalt (“educative institution”) has played an important role 
in the debates about the Bildung, in the case of authors like Schleiermacher, Novalis, and Schiller; 
Beiser, “A Romantic Education”, p. 291.
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